

Leadership Responsiveness in Local Unions and Title VII Compliance: Does More Democracy Mean More Representation for Blacks and Women?*

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The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between local union democracy and compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.¹ Although Title VII compliance encompasses a myriad of employment practices, the ones which are of interest here are those covering promotion, transfer, and upgrading policies.² The changes in these promotion and upgrading policies that are required by the Act can be made through changes in the seniority system, the posting and bidding procedures, and training programs in the collective bargaining agreement at the local union's initiation.

This study includes 11 case studies of local union compliance in two international unions. The information is based on semistructured interviews with five to six leaders from each local. From these, a detailed case history of compliance in each local was constructed, which included the employer's characteristics, the community characteristics, the structural characteristics of the local, the key events leading to compliance, and the local leadership's ideology.

There is reason to expect that local union democracy will affect a local's compliance with the law. Although the direction of this relationship is arguable, it is posited here that union democracy will have a positive effect on compliance. First, it seems plausible that the more democratic the union, the more responsive it may be to an outside

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¹ Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.

² Section 703h of the statute stated that bona fide seniority systems were lawful, but under *Griggs v. Duke Power*, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and *Quarles v. Philip Morris*, 279 F.Supp. 505 (1968), the courts ordered the use of plantwide seniority systems for promotions, the use of posting and bidding procedures, and the use of rate retention for transferees.

change, including a law. This assumes that the more democratic the local union is, the more permeable it is and that permeability leads to positive responsiveness. Democracy in a local union also implies a high degree of individual participation. The individuals who can differentially benefit from this participation may be from those groups such as blacks and females which had limited participation in their unions in the past.³ Finally, a democratic union implies not only an active membership but a responsive leadership. Thus, leadership responsiveness to demands by blacks and females, such as Title VII-related changes, may be great in a democratic union both because such demands are likely to be voiced and because the leadership is likely to respond.

On the other hand, it is possible that union democracy may be negatively associated with Title VII-compliance activity. If we assume that more democracy implies a clearer expression of majority interests, and if we assume also that majority and minority interests—minority being blacks and females—are in conflict,⁴ then more democracy may not lead to compliance. However, the author still contends that union democracy will have a positive effect on compliance. Since the history of most unions is that of severely limited participation of blacks and women, it seems that greater democracy will cause greater participation and representation of these two groups.

This study is an approach to union democracy that departs from past studies in several key ways. The definition of democracy is broadened to include the idea of representation of a group's objective interests by the leadership rather than just its demographic representation in the leadership, as well as the idea of minority representation and minority participation. (In this study minority refers to blacks and women.) There is also an attempt to see the *results* of these democratic processes in terms of the responsiveness of the leadership to demands of blacks and females. Leadership responsiveness means positive responsiveness to the demands of these groups, as indicated by the local union's compliance with Title VII. Compliance is defined here as the activity or behavior of a local union which moves it *toward* compliance with Title VII.⁵

³ Herbert Hill, *Black Labor and the American Legal System*, Vol. II (Washington: BNA, 1977).

⁴ Carol Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

⁵ The measure of compliance here is broader than legal compliance only. It includes: (1) the presence of plantwide seniority for upgrading; (2) the ambiguity of contract language on upgrading; (3) a procedure for posting; (4) provisions for rate retention; (5) a nondiscrimination provision and a provision for a joint civil rights committee; (6) a provision for nondiscriminatory training; (7) provisions requiring

Issues in the Field

The question of whether unions are democratic has provided scholars with a rich area for inquiry and commentary for the last 50 years. Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in union democracy which has not only raised new issues that need to be addressed, but which has challenged some of the conceptualization and measurement of democracy used in the past.⁶

There are several faults with the dominant conceptualization of democracy in these past studies. First of all, the measures used are often overly mechanical in nature. What appear to be differences in the degree of democracy often are purely artifacts of the mathematical formula used to construct these measures. Second, the conceptualization of democracy is narrow in that it involves democratic processes only, rather than the impact of democracy. A third problem is that democracy in these studies is narrowly defined as direct participation only, rather than representation. One result of this is that a union tends to be forced into a dichotomous classification as either a bureaucracy or a democracy with nothing in between. The assumption in many of these studies is that changes in the amount of participation (or in the amount of demographic representation) change the result. In fact, the assumption is that the greater the participation, the better—that is, the more representative—the result. The fourth problem with these studies is that the definition of participation is often narrow in scope. It usually only encompasses political forms of participation, the governance activities internal to the union, such as attending meetings, voting for officers, and running for office, rather than economic or social forms of participation, such as voting on contract ratification, striking, or discussing union affairs with friends.

Conceptualization

There are four different conceptualizations of democratic process presented. The relationship of each of these to leadership responsiveness will be examined. Two of these are traditional measures involving the

nondiscriminatory testing or union participation in testing; (8) an incorporation of Title VII standards in grievance language and arbitration clauses; and (9) other efforts such as filing EEOC complaints, lawsuits, or unfair labor practice charges. The measure accounts for the amount of procompliance change that has taken place. The legal definition now under *T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc. v. U.S.* and *Teamsters v. U.S.*, 431 U.S. 324, 14 FEP Cases 1514 (1977) is that departmental seniority systems which are bona fide are legal.

⁶ George Strauss, "Union Government in the U.S.: Research Past and Future," *Industrial Relations* 16 (May 1977), pp. 215–42; John C. Anderson, "A Comparative Analysis of Local Union Democracy," *Industrial Relations* 17 (October 1978), pp. 278–95.

number of participants and the amount of competition for union office and two are new measures involving the participation and the representation of minority interests. The first is the *decentralization of decision-making*, or the extent to which decision-making is dispersed among many people, rather than among a few. The second is the presence of competition in the form of *factions*. This is based on the idea that competition provides a choice, or at least a way of making the leadership in power accountable. These two ideas have been prevalent in the literature. A third measure of democracy can be defined as the *direct participation of blacks and women* in the leadership or demographic representation. This definition is based on the idea that democracy can happen through representation and that an individual who is a member of a group is a representative of the group. The fourth component of democracy is the *black advocacy* and *female advocacy* which is the representation of the objective interests of blacks and females by either blacks, females, or other individuals. It should be noted that it is not necessary to be a member of the group to be an advocate.

Results

Decentralization

The decentralization of decision-making in locals or the number of decision-makers does not appear to be associated with responsiveness to Title VII. (Decentralization in this study is measured by the absolute number of people who wield the power to make the local's decisions concerning collective bargaining.) There is not a great deal of variation in the absolute number of decision-makers across locals, as is indicated by Table 1. Most of the locals have only two or three decision-makers except for Local No. 9 which has 17. From the interview material, it is clear that Local No. 9's compliance activity did not result from this decentralization but rather from the imposition of a consent decree which was agreed to by the international union, the employer, and the government.

There may be several reasons why decentralization is not associated with high levels of compliance activity. The first is that the more decentralized the organization, the more opportunity there is for majority expression, and the majority was strongly opposed to Title VII changes in these locals. The second explanation lies in the way organizational decentralization was measured—by the number of decision-makers in the bargaining area. As has been pointed out, a union has two governments—one which governs the bargaining area and one which governs

TABLE 1
Local Union Scores

Local #	COMP	TRIC	No. of DMKERS	FACT	BL PART	BL ADVOC*	FE PART	FE ADVOC
1	34.5	High	2.0 (2)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2	26	Med	3.6 (4)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
3	24	Med	3.3 (3)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
4	24	Med	5.5 (6)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
5	21	Low	3.5 (4)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
6	20	Low	3.0 (3)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
7	28	High	1.9 (2)	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
8	25	Med	1.75 (2)	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
9	30	High	17.0 (17)	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
10	17.5	Low	2.0 (2)	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
11	23.5	Med	2.3 (2)	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

* Chi-square of BL ADVOC and trichotomous Comp. = 6.5, df = 2, sig = .03.

Definitions: COMP = local compliance with Title VII (see fn. 4); TRIC = trichotomous compliance with Title VII; No. of DMKERS = decentralization—number of decision-makers, averaged and rounded off; FACT = two viable local factions which run candidates for election; BL PART = black participation in the local at or above the level of steward; BL ADVOC = black advocacy or interest representation of blacks in the local; FE PART = female participation in the local at or above the level of steward; FE ADVOC = female advocacy or interest representation of females in the local.

the daily administration of the union. Perhaps decentralization should have been measured through decision-making in another area.

Factions

The reason that factions may make a difference for leadership responsiveness of locals is that their presence implies a degree of choice for the members. Of the locals, four had factions. Local No. 1 was the only one in which two factions had different positions on Title VII. However, according to the interviews, it is the adoption of the goal of non-discrimination by the leadership as a whole, not the presence of factions, which is responsible for the local's compliance. In the other three locals (Nos. 3, 6, and 10), the factions are not based on race or they do not have different positions on Title VII. There are no locals whose factions represent female interests, although Local No. 1 comes the closest to this. It appears that representation of black and female interests through factions is quite limited, but it may be useful to look at direct participation of these two groups.

Black Participation

In this study, black participation in the leadership is defined as the presence of a black in an elected leadership position at the level of a steward or above. The results indicate that although participation does not seem to harm compliance efforts, it does not seem to guarantee

them. Each local has some black participation, although most of the locals have only *one* person who was a black participant. However, the locals vary in their amount of compliance activity. This pattern, plus the interview material, suggests that there may be factors besides participation which explain compliance. In fact, in the three locals, Nos. 7, 8, and 9, which have more than one black participant and which have moderate to high responsiveness to Title VII, the compliance activity is not due to the number of black participants, but rather to outside forces, such as the international union staff and the NAACP which used legal sanctions to change the leadership's response.

Black Advocacy

What seems to be much more critical than black participation is black advocacy. For example, the two locals with no advocacy are two out of the three lowest compliance locals. Similarly, of the eight locals where there is some black advocacy, three are high in compliance, five are medium in compliance, and only one is low in compliance (see Table 1). The interviews confirm the role that advocacy plays, particularly in the early stages of compliance.

Female Participation

As can be seen from Table 1, there are only five locals with female participation. The reasons for this include the recent hiring date of women, which gives them less job security, less "stake" in their jobs, and less familiarity with fellow employees. Also, a reticent to hostile attitude on the part of the male local union leadership is a deterrent.

Female Advocacy

There are six locals with no female advocacy (see Table 1). In general, female advocacy does not seem to be as effective as black advocacy in causing compliance. In only two locals, No. 1 and No. 2, is female advocacy associated with compliance. Even in Locals Nos. 9, 10, and 11 where there were specific demands made by the females, the local advocacy was belated and was instigated by the international union.

In summary, advocacy aids compliance more than does decentralization, factions, or actual participation. It is important to note that advocacy helps mainly in raising the issue. Black advocacy is clearly more effective than female advocacy.

Conclusions

With the exception of Local No. 1, it seems that bureaucratic means such as the intervention of the international union are responsible for

the *achievement of compliance* in these locals. This intervention is necessary even where the local is “democratic” in the sense that it has several decision-makers, that it has several factions, and that it has direct participation of blacks and women in the leadership. However, this does not mean that democratic processes have no effect on leadership responsiveness, as measured by Title VII compliance. The representation of black interests through a black advocate in the leadership does help the process, *by raising the issue* initially and by evoking early leadership responsiveness. This is less true with female advocacy than with black advocacy. Advocacy does not translate automatically into leadership responsiveness because of (1) the opposition of the majority of members in these locals, (2) the lack of power of the advocates, and (3) the ideology that union leaders hold regarding the neutrality of all seniority systems.

The results may look discouraging in several ways. First of all, there is not much support for the idea that union democracy has a positive impact on Title VII compliance. Second, the prospects for local unions voluntarily complying with Title VII—that is, both initiating and achieving compliance activity without external pressure—appears to be unlikely. Thus, much of successful compliance may depend heavily on the role of the international, the EEOC, and the courts.

The policy implications of this study are significant. If civil rights compliance is a “top down” rather than a “bottom up” process, the role of the international union in the enforcement process becomes crucial. Perhaps, the utility of more bureaucratic devices such as consent decrees, in which the international union takes the responsibility for carrying out compliance in its locals, should be the topic of further investigation.

This study suggests several unresolved questions which can be addressed by future research. In terms of the conceptualization of union democracy, more work can be done to see what the various dimensions of union democracy are. For instance, what is the relationship between democratic procedures and democratic results? More work can be done to discover the effect of union democracy in other areas of policy compliance, such as compliance with occupational safety and health legislation. Since other policy areas may not involve the potential conflict between majority and minority interests which Title VII implies, this may increase the chance that democracy may lead to compliance.

DISCUSSION

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Let me begin by noting that all three of these papers constitute fine examples of the new rigor and precision that characterize the work now being done in this field which has lain dormant for too many years. These three papers include two empirical studies of local union democracy and its effects on, respectively, international union convention democracy and local union Title VII compliance. The third paper is a theoretical discussion of the problem of democracy with particular attention to its definition. To summarize briefly the findings of the empirical studies, Anderson found that convention delegates who participated in local union decision-making also actively participated in convention activities. However, convention delegates from more democratic local unions participated less actively in convention activities, and active participation at the convention was “totally unrelated” to the measures of convention process and outcomes. Hoyman found “not much support” for the idea that union democracy has a positive impact on Title VII compliance.

As a point of departure for discussing the three papers, might we not ask if these findings are at all unexpected or surprising? I would submit that they are neither. Much of the surprise which the authors express over their findings can be attributed to their distinction between outcomes and processes. The hypothesized relationship in both studies is that democratic processes will lead to democratic outcomes. A priori, this proposition is vulnerable on two counts. First, there may be no such thing as a democratic outcome which is separate and distinct from the process used to reach it. So long as the process of deciding is democratic, goes the argument, then the outcome is necessarily democratic. To argue the contrary is to unwarrantedly presume to be able to discern which outcomes are democratic and which are not. The conundrum which the U.S. Supreme Court confronted in the *Teamsters* case¹ (to which case Hoyman cites extensively) of choosing between seniority and affirmative action indicates the dimensions of the problem.

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¹ *International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States*, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (1977).

Second, if what is meant by democratic process is some kind of majority rule, then we would expect application of that rule to occasion outcomes favorable to the majority and often, necessarily, less favorable or unfavorable to the minority(ies) within the local union. That there can be and all too often is a tyranny of the majority was one of the reasons for the passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. From this perspective, Hoyman's finding that the union leadership was often instrumental in moving the local toward Title VII compliance is less ironic.

Refining the Study of Union Democracy

The assumption of both of the empirical studies is that unions should be democratic, but only Hoyman begins to examine the basis of this assumption. A similar demand is not made of employers. Why therefore the disparity in treatment between unions and employers? The answer derives in large part from the practice of exclusive representation. Unlike the managerial employee who both negotiates his salary and adjusts his grievances individually with his employer, the unionized employee under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act must engage in both of these practices collectively through his bargaining agent. Because the union is the employees' exclusive representative, our democratic heritage demands as a quid pro quo that that representation be a democratic one. The consequence is a democratic imperative directed at local unions.

In contrast to this democratic imperative is the autocratic imperative dictated by the pragmatics of high pressure, high stakes, last-minute negotiating with large, often recalcitrant employers. Exclusive representation is an important factor in maintaining the power and strength of the bargaining agent in the face of employer resistance.

The two imperatives are inconsistent. A balance must be struck between them. As that balance has been struck in American industrial relations it imposes a duty of fair representation upon the bargaining agent which duty falls short of compelling pristine democratic processes within unions. Direct democracy is eschewed in favor of representative democracy. Membership ratification of strike calls and/or of contracts is not universally required by law. A union member must prove that his bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation before he can individually adjust his grievance with his employer.² All of the items just mentioned represent procedural compromises with the pristine model of direct democracy.

² *Vaca v. Sipes*, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903 (1967).

This perspective of compromise suggests three sets of questions. First, when, i.e., with regard to which issues, must such compromises be struck in order to preserve the essential strength of collective bargaining? For example, the case for compromising the individual employee's control over his own grievance is much weaker than that for compromising his control over his own bargaining of his terms of employment.³ Is this a proper subject for compromise in the first place? Such an issue-by-issue approach is precisely that advocated by Hochner et al.

Second, what degree of control should be exercised over each issue by the individual union member and by the union leadership? If, for example, we concede that complete handling of grievances by individual union members is properly compromised, ought an individual employee nevertheless be permitted to carry his grievance to arbitration over the refusal of his union to do so? A subsidiary issue here is the degree to which control exercised by an elected leadership is undemocratic. If one believes in the efficacy of representative democracy, then perhaps the claimed inconsistency between the democratic and the autocratic imperatives is a false one. This question of relative degree of control is precisely the second facet of Hochner et al.'s approach to the problem.

Note that by specifying the subject and the degree of control over that subject, a new and welcome measure of precision is introduced into the discussion of union democracy, but note further that I specify the subjects much more narrowly than the five broad categories suggested by Hochner et al.

Third, what of the prior question of exclusive representation? Were that principle to be deleted from our law and a system of nonexclusive representation modeled on the British system substituted in its place, might that not diffuse (almost) in its entirety the debate over union democracy? Then the individual employee would be able to decide for himself what should be the relative distribution of authority between himself and his union leader over any particular issue by joining or forming whatever union suited his demand for democracy.

³ See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, "Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration," 37 *NYU Law Review* 362 (1962).

DISCUSSION

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The late Reverend A. J. Muste wrote in 1928 that the trade union seeks to combine within itself three divergent types of social structure—an army, a business, and a democratic town meeting.¹ Each local union must have a department of war and a department of state. The late Professor George W. Taylor wrote in 1958 that the main functions of the union are primarily to: “(1) make available to individual employees a right effectively to participate in a determination of the conditions under which they work; (2) discern, reconcile and then represent the diverse and often conflicting demands and interests of its memberships and . . . even the interests of non-members in a bargaining unit. . . .; (3) share with the employer the making of important business decisions in which the needs of union members are reconciled with the needs of the business enterprise.”²

I note that both viewed the union in a continuing relationship with management, as an organization of workers sharing in the union’s decisions and as an effective bureaucratic organization. These basic aspects influenced the structure, as well as the internal and external behavior, of unions. Their formulations incorporate the notion that power is an important reality conceptualizing, describing, and analyzing union democracy. I would like you to consider the foregoing as we discuss the three papers.

All the authors are critical of and dissatisfied with the existing approaches to the study of union democracy. Hochner-Koziara-Schmidt complain about the absence of an “explicit framework or . . . a commonly agreed upon definition of union democracy”; Hoyman finds “several faults with the dominant conceptualization of democracy in . . . past studies”; and Anderson concludes that “only a few studies have examined the association between membership participation and other dimensions of union democracy.”

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¹ “Factional Fights in Trade Unions,” in *American Labor Dynamics*, J. B. S. Hardman, ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928), pp. 332–48, pp. 332, 335.

² “The Role of Unions in a Democratic Society,” Selected Readings, *Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members*, Senate, Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 85th Congress, 2nd session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1958), pp. 16–25.

All the authors are seeking to reduce the diversity and complexity of union democracy to a clearer identity. The Hoyman and Anderson papers are behavioral and quantitative with tight conceptual structures. The Hochner-Koziara-Schmidt paper is of a different genre. It seeks answers to criterion and utility questions about union democracy and why the subject should be researched, develops a nonnormative definition to provide an empirical and theoretical guide to research, and presents some implications of the new framework.

The papers reflect a renewed interest in local unions, contribute ideas and data about union democracy, and stimulate us to reexamine a critical aspect of industrial relations. Although unstated in the Hoyman and Anderson papers and deliberately avoided in the Hochner-Koziara-Schmidt paper, all authors assume that union democracy is a preferred state of affairs.

Professor Hoyman's study includes 11 case studies of local union compliance with Title VII, EEO in two international unions. She relates various features of union democracy to the amount of leadership responsiveness to black and female demands, as measured by the amount of compliance activity of the local union. The paper stresses the concepts of participation and impact.

The conclusions of her study are helpful and thoughtful and raise critical questions about the nature of democratic locals. To achieve compliance with Title VII after the international signed a consent decree, the decision of the majority of union members had to be overridden. She found that the more democratic the union is in representing majority interests, the less democratic it is in responding to the interests of minority-group members. We must be cautious in generalizing from her findings to all local unions. It is clear that in a conflict between Title VII and seniority, the vote of the majority must give way to public law.

Significant is the conclusion that neither the number of people participating in decisions, nor the presence of factions, nor the participation of blacks and females in the leadership makes any difference for leadership responsiveness or Title VII compliance. In addition to the intervention of the international, outside interest groups and the courts were involved in achieving compliance with Title VII.

Regarding union democracy, Hoyman's results suggest that under certain conditions the international union may be the key factor to achieve a type of democracy essential for protecting minorities. Parallels may be found in wildcat strikes intended to change national agreements and corrupt local unions. And I agree with her that the concept

of union democracy is “multidimensional,” as suggested by Muste and Taylor.

Anderson focused on local union activists, who were delegates to the national union convention, and participation as measures of democracy. He hypothesized that activists from democratic local unions would be more active in the convention and would see the process and outcomes as more democratic. A noteworthy finding is that the “more democratic the control structure, the less likely it is that the delegate will be active at the convention.” Although generally the results show that more participative members will be more active at the convention, there is some inconsistency among the dependent variables.

Anderson’s study linked local union activists with a national union convention to determine the saliency of participation. This is a broader approach to participation as one of the critical measures of union democracy. The correlations between the independent and dependent variables raise some questions about the hypothesis, but additional studies may add some light on union democracy. Anderson noted that the measures one chooses affect the impact of participation, an indication that the values of the researcher may influence critically the extent of union democracy.

In “Thinking about Democracy and Participation in Unions,” the authors seek to develop a behavioral and nonnormative definition of union democracy to provide a theoretical and empirical guide to research. The authors define democracy as “rule by the governed” in terms of degree, not either/or. I note that if this definition were applied to the Hoyman data where the majority opposed compliance with EEOC, then there was no democracy since blacks and women would continue suffering discrimination. Another misgiving is that it ignores the role of public law, as well as other factors influencing union democracy.

The authors postulate a multidimensional definition, including the issues controlled by the members and the organizational level at which control is exercised over a particular issue. My apprehension here is that too many discrete boxes emerge with questionable links. Their efforts to achieve a value-free, behavioral, and quantifiable definition create further difficulties because diverse types of union-management relationships, varied local unions, and different stages of union development do not lend themselves to precise models.

I find more problems as the degree of control dimension is micro-sliced into numerous variables, each presumably separate, objective, and measurable. I share with the authors the notion that informal controls by members are significant in assessing union democracy. Professor Jack Barbash wrote that the manner in which the secretary in the union of-

fice treats members is an indicator of the texture of union democracy. He also wrote that democratic intentions and the will to democracy are important features of union democracy.

Studying union government is complex, as the authors of the three papers assert. But their mechanistic and positivistic approach does not impress me as the road to knowledge. It is neither possible nor desirable to develop a value-free framework. Professor Hoyman's paper reflects a more sensitive and institutional feel for the subject than do the other two. Quantitative methodology compels researchers to trivialize their descriptive variables and to force relationships among them in order to obtain data suitable for statistical manipulation. This is neither a precise nor sophisticated approach because the alleged exact (and nonnormative) research design induces imprecise, inaccurate, and incompatible descriptive statements.

Of course, leadership, participation, representation, control over decisions, the presence or absence of institutionalized factions or parties, constitutional structures and processes, external law, technology, market forces, relationships with management, functions of unions, and power influence local union democracy. How to arrange the foregoing in a useful paradigm which indicates associations and causes in a dynamic manner is the challenge.

A political theorist suggested that private, voluntary, homogeneous, single-purpose, and independent organizations are not supposed to be mini-democracies because in a pluralistic society the push-pull of all such organizations, including unions, contributes to a democratic society. This is worth considering as we think about and study union democracy.

All the papers contribute to our conceptual inventory and add to our understanding of union democracy by disconfirming some conventional wisdom. As an old supporter of impact studies, I am pleased with the authors' consideration of the actual workings of union democracy. As the late Professor Taylor repeatedly said, "pragmatism proves the doubt that theory cannot."

I would hope that our young, bright, technically skilled, and questioning scholars would place their operationalizing efforts in proper perspective. There are various kinds of usable knowledge, as Professors Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen recently wrote.³ Incorporating other modes for framing questions, developing research designs, gathering and analyzing data and drawing meaningful inferences, and, above all, getting at the essence of local unions, would enhance and enlarge our understanding of local union democracy.

³ *Usable Knowledge* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1979).